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A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard 
in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response 
 
The outbreak of disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health 
risk that involves both the government and individual livestock producers.  Economic 
justifications for public intervention in disease control include externalities, public good aspects, 
coordination failures, information failures, and income distribution considerations (Ramsay, 
Philip and Riethmuller).  The potential to pose a large economic cost depends on many factors 
including trade laws and level of infectiousness.  Public policies range from bounties for infected 
livestock to required herd depopulation and farm decontamination.  The United States 
Department of Agriculture´s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) provides 
inspection and quarantine services to prevent the introduction of disease across national borders 
and also coordinates response to disease outbreaks that originate from within the country.  
Border measures that protect against incursion of disease are provided to protect the safety of the 
American food production system and to prevent infection of the domestic livestock industry.   
Diseases not endemic to or currently present in the U.S. are typically not accounted for in 
everyday farm biosecurity measures because their risk of occurrence is viewed as exogenous to 
individual farm-level decision making.  Diseases that are highly contagious or have human 
health implications are often the target of government eradication programs.  When livestock is 
taken by the government for public health or economic reasons, the Fifth Amendment of the US 
Constitution specifies that private property taken for public use must receive just compensation.  
This compensation takes the form of indemnity payments.  The current federal compensation 
level is defined by the Animal Health Protection Act, Subtitle E of the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 which states that compensation shall be based on the fair market value,   2
as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, adjusted for any other compensation received for 
that event (i.e., disaster payments).  States may also offer compensation in the form of 
indemnities.  
  Livestock taken for disease control or eradication reasons also results in consequential 
losses on the affected farms (which might include surrounding farms or related industries).  
These consequential losses include business interruption, lost market access, lost genetic stock, 
and increased surveillance and testing costs (Grannis and Bruch).  Other government programs 
may be used to assist farms with the consequential losses.  These include low interest emergency 
loans from the US Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency or even disaster payments 
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Grannis and Bruch).  There is also much 
recent talk about the potential for livestock disease insurance.  However, indemnity payments are 
the primary form of compensation based on the livestock removed from the operation.  The 
indemnity as it is currently used is designed to pay for assets taken by the government and 
encourage reporting of disease (Ott).  The indemnity payments for diseased livestock represent 
an implicit insurance policy for livestock producers with respect to the diseases where they are 
applicable.   Government indemnities must be designed with careful attention to the private 
incentives they create and the public objectives of livestock disease risk management.  The 
current system to determine payment amounts largely ignores the issue of incentive 
compatibility. 
Previous economic research dealing with livestock disease eradication and outbreak has 
examined producer response to prices in conjunction with government indemnity programs for 
scrapies in the U.S. (Kuchler and Hamm), optimal actions to contain Foot and Mouth Disease 
outbreak in France (Mahul and Gohin), the effect of government programs to eradicate disease   3
on prevalence level and private control efforts in New Zealand (Bicknell, Wilen and Howitt), and 
the dynamics of optimally controlling infection from a disease which is transmitted between 
wildlife and livestock (Horan and Wolf).  The current paper uses a principal-agent model to 
examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the 
government and individual farmers.  A less formal discussion of these issues may be found in 
Gramig et al. (2005).  Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated this asymmetry.  
We investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and 
magnitude of a disease epidemic.  Our focus is on farm level biosecurity choices and disclosure 
of disease status. 
Individuals have private information about preventive biosecurity measures in place on 
their farms prior to outbreak (ex ante), and following outbreak (ex post) they possess private 
information about the disease status of their herd.  We first address the ex post case because once 
uncertainty about the occurrence of an outbreak is resolved, regardless of the ex ante actions 
taken by producers, disclosure of disease status (as opposed to discovery by another party 
through transmission, slaughter, or testing) is required for timely government response to limit 
the spread of infectious disease and eradicate it.  The length of time between outbreak and 
discovery is very important in determining the duration and severity of epidemic (UN-FAO).  
For these reasons, an incentive structure that results in truthful disclosure of disease status is of 
great interest for a social planner.  Second, we investigate the design of ex ante incentives for 
biosecurity along with incentives for ex post truthful disclosure.  The characteristics of an 
incentive compatibile indemnity rule are derived for the case of a risk averse agent (the farmer) 
and a risk neutral principal (government agency).  Implications of the theoretical model results 
for public policy and market insurance design are considered and conclusions are offered.   4
 
A Model of Ex Post Moral Hazard 
Consider a simple model of a single, risk-averse farmer with a livestock herd at risk of 
contracting a disease.  The farmer’s indirect utility function is defined as V(π) (V′>0, V″<0), 
where π represents profits.  If the herd is not infected, then  0 π π = , where  0 π  represents a 
constant, deterministic value.  The farmer suffers regulatory or disease related losses in the event 
of a disease outbreak, but he may also qualify for government provided indemnity payments.  
For now, we assume there are no externalities associated with the disease—that is, the infection 
cannot be spread to other herds, and there are no regulatory or pecuniary externalities associated 
with regional or national trade bans and/or quarantines.  Rather, all losses only accrue to the 
farmer with the infected herd. 
We assume that the farmer knows the true disease prevalence rate in his herd, θ∈[0,1], 
but that the regulator does not know θ without testing or disclosure by the farmer.  If a herd is 
infected, then profits depend on whether or not that farmer discloses the disease outbreak to the 
regulator.  We assume that an infected farmer who discloses the disease will face regulatory 
costs and other losses, C(θ), that are non-decreasing in the disease prevalence rate, but he will be 
compensated (at least to some degree) with an indemnity payment, I(θ).  Profits in the case of 
disclosure are therefore  ) ( ) ( 0 θ θ π π C I − + = .  In the case of non-disclosure, the farmer only 
incurs losses directly due to the disease, L(θ), and he is not indemnified, so that profits are 
) ( 0 θ π π L − = . 
If the farmer reports an infection, the regulator will test the herd to find the true 
prevalence rate, and respond in a manner consistent with protocol specific to the nature of the 
particular disease; culling infected animals and providing an appropriate indemnity payment, for   5
example.  Hence, a farmer who chooses to disclose will report truthfully because there are no 
gains from under-reporting θ.  But will a farmer with infected livestock choose to disclose?  
Depending on the design of the indemnity payments (whether or not indemnities are inclusive of 
direct animal losses and consequential losses from business interruption) and the magnitude of 
regulatory costs, the farmer would have an incentive to withhold this information if he expects to 
be worse off after disclosure.  Hence, a moral hazard problem exists in light of the government 
or policy objective of truthful disclosure of disease status.  We follow the convention set forth in 
the literature and refer to this as an ex post moral hazard problem, in that the farmer already 
knows the true value of θ (the state of nature). In the following section, we also consider an ex 
ante moral hazard problem in which the farmer makes biosecurity choices, which are 
unobservable to the regulator, prior to the realization of θ. 
The farmer will disclose truthfully as long as disclosure improves his utility. Since utility 
depends only on profits and since there is no uncertainty associated with the decision to disclose, 
utility will be improved as long as the profits from disclosing are not less than the profits from 
not disclosing 
(1) ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 0 θ π θ θ π L C I − ≥ − + . 
Assuming the regulator is able and willing to pay enough for disclosure (but no more) and that 
an indifferent farmer will disclose, then the optimal indemnity payment that encourages truthful 
disclosure is  
(2)  I(θ) = C(θ) – L(θ). 
Hence, the farmer is fully indemnified against the alternative state (i.e., that which arises under 
non-disclosure).  This means that the optimal indemnity payment is not simply the market value   6
of animals that the regulator culls in response to the infection, as is the case under current APHIS 
guidelines, but is reduced by any losses that the farmer would incur even without disclosure.  
It also means that optimal indemnity payments are positive for cases where farm losses with the 
disease are less than the costs related to reporting (including market value and consequential 
losses).  
Note that the indemnity payment is designed to induce truthful reporting and therefore 
does not require monitoring farmers who do not report incidence of disease.  Rather, monitoring 
only occurs on infected farms in the form of testing after disclosure.  This is consistent with 
actual policy, where any reported incidence of disease is verified by testing, and indemnities paid 
are based on actual prevalence and regulator response to the severity of the specific disease.  
Special government indemnity programs for eradication of persistent diseases are not uncommon 
in the United States (Kuchler and Hamm; Wolf). 
Note also from (2) that total indemnity payments are not necessarily increasing in disease 
prevalence, but rather depend on the difference between marginal regulatory costs and marginal 
losses 
(3)  ) ( ) ( ) ( θ θ θ L C I ′ − ′ = ′  
which may be positive or negative.  That is, this rule designates that the indemnity payment may 
be increasing over some range of prevalence and declining past that prevalence. Consider a case 
where losses related to reporting a disease are initially greater than private losses with the disease 
unreported, but as prevalence increases, private losses exceed the losses from reporting (Figure 
1).  If (2) does not hold, as may occur when indemnities are based solely on the market value of 
condemned animals, (1) may never hold, or it may only hold for a subset of θ.  So, for instance, 
there might be a threshold value of θ, denoted θ*, such that farmers report truthfully whenever θ   7
≥ θ*, and they are untruthful when θ < θ*.  The situation where (1) does not hold because of the 
structure of indemnities, forms the essence of the principal-agent problem that exists between the 
regulator and the farmer and it highlights the conflicting incentives at work in the agency 
relationship.  The features of an incentive compatible contract or mechanism that avoids this 
pitfall are our focus. 
 
Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard 
Now consider farmer incentives to make ex ante investments in biosecurity that can reduce the 
risk of a disease outbreak.  Specifically, the farmer can purchase biosecurity, b, at a per unit price 
of w, in order to affect the probability density of prevalence, f(θ,b), where F(θ,b) is the 
cumulative density function with  0 ) , ( ≥ b Fb θ  – that is, F satisfies first-order stochastic 
dominance.
1  The farmer has private incentives to make biosecurity investments to the extent that 
these investments will reduce the risk of any non-indemnified losses.  However, the level of 
investment may differ from the level that the regulator might deem to be optimal (we discuss the 
regulator objective function below).  In that case, the regulator would want to encourage 
additional investment.  Policy could achieve this by either subsidizing b, or by making indemnity 
payments contingent on b, assuming that b is observable.  But the more interesting and relevant 
case, to which we direct our attention, is when b is unobservable. 
In principle, biosecurity choices that involve capital investment, such as fencing to keep 
infected wildlife off the farm, are observable (although their maintenance and proper use is likely 
not observable), while management-based activities that contribute to biosecurity, such as 
                                                 
1 Subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout. Also, the distribution is conditional on biosecurity, b, throughout.  
We write the distribution as F(θ,b) following Holmstrom.   8
quarantining potentially infected animals introduced onto the farm, are unobservable.  
Unobservable choices are a potential source of ex ante moral hazard.  For instance, suppose 
L(θ)=0, so that the truth-telling indemnity payment from (2) is I(θ) = C(θ).  In this case, profits 
are always  wb − = 0 π π  and the farmer bears no risk of losses from infection.  The government 
fully insures all farmers and there is no premium associated with this coverage level.  Clearly, 
b=0 is the optimal farmer choice in this case.  When L(θ)>0, then the farmer does bear some risk 
and hence has some incentives to invest in biosecurity, but perhaps not enough from the 
regulator’s perspective, given that the regulator incurs all indemnification expenses when losses 
arise. 
It is generally understood that two policy instruments are needed to address the two moral 
hazard problems that exist in the current situation (Timbergen).  When dealing with only the ex 
post moral hazard problem, we used indemnity payments to eliminate the problem.  When 
dealing with both ex post and ex ante moral hazard, however, we will use indemnity payments to 
address the ex ante moral hazard problem and introduce penalties to deal with the ex post moral 
hazard problem.  As described below, penalties impose more risk on the producer in the non-
disclosure state and reduce the indemnity required to overcome the ex post moral hazard 
problem.  
Consider applying penalties of the form P(θ) in the case that the farmer does not disclose 
an infected herd and is discovered.  The probability of being discovered is denoted by α(θ), with 
αθ>0 so that detection is more likely for herds with a high prevalence rate.  In this case, 
assuming that disclosure occurs under indifference, the farmer will disclose truthfully any value 
θ>0 as long as the following condition holds   9
(4) 
) ) ( ( )) ( 1 (                                                         




wb P L V wb C I V
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Equation (4) represents the incentive compatibility condition in reporting disease status.  Given 
I(θ) and α(θ), the penalty function P(θ) can be set to ensure that condition (4) holds.
2  Assuming 
this is done, the farmer will always disclose truthfully (and hence the penalty will never actually 
be used, although random inspections of those who do not disclose must still be made for the 
penalty to be deemed credible).  Moreover, the farmer knows this ex ante and will therefore 
choose biosecurity to maximize  )} ) ( ) ( ( { 0 wb C I V E − − + θ θ π , where E is the expectations 
operator with respect to θ. 
Although the penalty is never applied, it has the desired effect—it increases the risk 
associated with non-disclosure so that the farmer always discloses.  Additionally, because risk is 
increased in the non-disclosure state (right-hand side of equation (4)) and because equation (4) 
guarantees that the farmer is indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing, this means that 
the indemnity payments can be set in such a way that, ex ante, the farmer is exposed to more risk 
within the disclosure state (left-hand side of equation (4)).  Indeed, from (4), it is straightforward 
to show that  ) ( ) ( ) ( θ θ θ L C I ′ − ′ < ′  as long asP′ is positive (or not too negative, although we 
expect that it would be positive).  The marginal indemnity payments are reduced and the farmer 
is exposed to greater ex ante risk relative to the case in which only the ex post moral hazard 
problem arises.  This increased risk creates the necessary incentives for farmers to choose the 
                                                 
2 We assume that setting P(θ) optimally, where there is a tradeoff between the penalty level and the probability of 
detection, α, achieves the behavior desired by the principal.  There is an extensive literature on the economics of 
monitoring and enforcement which we do not address in depth, but use a general result that if P and α have 
equivalent power in deterring undesirable actions (which we assume), setting P to induce desired behavior is optimal 
because increasing α is more costly for the regulator.  The seminal work addressing this tradeoff is Becker (1968) 
and reviews of the literature can be found in Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and Russell (2003).  An application to 
regulation of animal agriculture can be found in Gramig (2004).   10
level of biosecurity that the regulator would have him choose in addition to truthfully reporting 
disease status. 
  Assuming the penalty solves the ex post moral hazard problem, we can now focus on the 
design of indemnity payments that solve the ex ante moral hazard problem.  First, however, we 
specify the regulator’s objective function.  Following Hyde and Vercammen (1997) and Baron 
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where κ is the weight the regulator applies to budgetary outlays, m is the monitoring cost of 
infected herds, and the constraint represents the farmer’s choice of biosecurity that maximizes 
his expected utility.
3  The farmer’s optimal selection of b ˆ is constrained to be b, the regulator’s 
desired investment in biosecurity, without loss of generality by the revelation principle 
(Myerson, 1979; Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin, 1979).  The regulator chooses I(θ) to 
maximize farmer utility while taking into account the cost of indemnities and monitoring 
required to implement the chosen disease risk management policy. 
Following Holmstrom (1979) and Mirrlees (1976), we substitute the agent’s first-order 
condition for the constraint in problem (5), so that (5) can be rewritten 
                                                 
3 As discussed in the previous footnote, P is optimally chosen to ensure that the incentive compatibility condition (4) 
holds while minimizing the cost of implementation for the regulator.  Monitoring costs, m, in the regulator’s 
objective function are taken to include both testing costs incurred following disclosure and additional monitoring 
resources devoted to discovery of disease under non-disclosure that determine the magnitude of α.  Note that our 
assumption involving optimal selection of P implies that a minimum level of additional monitoring outside of 
response to disclosure will occur.  The choice of the level of these additional monitoring resources cannot be 
determined from the maximization of (5) and is not addressed here.   11
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This method of solving the problem is called the first-order approach (e.g., Spence and 
Zeckhauser 1971; Ross 1973; Harris and Raviv 1979; Holmstrom 1979; Mirrlees 1975; 
Rogerson 1985).  The Lagrangian for the regulator’s problem is 
(7)    
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where µ is the shadow value of the constraint.  The existence of the constraint, due to the 
farmer’s freedom to make their own biosecurity decision, renders this a second-best problem.  In 
the Appendix we illustrate that µ>0 because the regulator would like the farmer to increase his 
investment in biosecurity given the optimal indemnity payment (Holmstrom (1979) also finds 
such a result). 
Following Holmstrom (1979), pointwise optimization with respect to I(θ) yields the 
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Condition (8) implicitly defines I(θ), the second-best indemnity as a function of θ.  The 
following adjoint equation is also necessary   12
(9) 
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µ , condition 
(9) reduces to 
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Condition (10) determines µ (while the constraint in (6) determines b). 
How do second-best indemnity payments compare to first-best payments?  First-best 
payments arise when there are no constraints on the regulator’s problem – that is, the regulator is 
neither constrained by the farmer’s first order condition nor is truthful disclosure an issue, so that 
there is neither an ex post nor ex ante moral hazard problem.  In this case, condition (8) reduces 
to 
(11) 0 ) ( = − ′ κ π V   
implicitly defining the first-best indemnity payment  ) (
* θ I  (with I
*′(θ) = C′(θ) > 0).  Comparing 
condition (11) with condition (8), we find that the following must hold 
(12) 















































As shown by Holmstrom (1979), the second-best payment is larger than the first-best payment 
when the farmer’s marginal return from increased biosecurity is positive, and the second-best 
payment is smaller when the farmer’s marginal return is negative.  Holmstrom (p.79) points out   13
that the term  f fb /  is simply the derivative of the maximum likelihood function ln(f), when b is 
taken as an unknown variable, and suggests that  f fb /  measures “how strongly one is inclined to 
infer from θ that the agent did not undertake the assumed action.”  The second best solution is 
dependent on the distribution of θ and its relationship to biosecurity, b.  The deviation from 
perfect risk sharing implies that the farmer (agent) must carry excess responsibility for the 
disease outcome. 
 
Implications for Public Policy and Market Insurance Design 
Status quo indemnification for livestock disease losses by USDA has paid producers on the basis 
of “fair market value” for any animals culled as a result of government intervention to contain 
the spread of disease (disease eradication programs like the scrapies bounty are an exception).  
There are no pre-established compensation rules in place prior to a disease event, budget 
allocations to respond to disease are made on an ad hoc basis, and compensation does not 
explicitly take into account consequential losses that result from government mandated culling or 
quarantine.  These aspects of current risk management policy may actually contribute to farmer 
uncertainty about the outcome of an outbreak and further demonstrate the origins of the agency 
problem considered.  Our model suggests that the structure of indemnities should take into 
account consequential losses rather than merely direct losses, but that the government likely 
should not fully insure farmers in an environment of asymmetric information.  This is a standard 
result in the principal-agent literature dealing with hidden action (Laffont and Martimort, 2002) 
and in the broader insurance literature (Arrow, 1963; Raviv, 1979).   
  In considering status quo risk management policy, animal health authorities are, in 
general, relying on a single mechanism—indemnities—to facilitate both ex ante and ex post   14
farmer effort.  Where localized eradication programs for a particular disease are in place, 
subsidization of biosecurity or bounties for sick animals may be instituted as mechanisms to 
achieve desired individual behavior.  Our model suggests that in order to provide incentives for 
biosecurity and truthful disclosure, an indemnity is not sufficient as a lone mechanism.  
Indemnities alone facilitate disclosure in the ex post moral hazard model, but without a second 
mechanism the incentives are not strong enough to implement the social planner’s desired level 
of ex ante biosecurity.  We propose using indemnities to achieve desired levels of biosecurity 
while implementing optimal penalties that induce disclosure of disease status.  Even without the 
introduction of penalties or some other mechanism that places additional risk on the farmer, the 
model suggests that current government indemnification procedures fail to satisfy incentive 
compatibility for even a single dimension of farmer effort that is subject to moral hazard.  
Indemnities must include consequential losses above fair market value in order to solve the ex 
post disclosure problem under asymmetric information.   
  One possible form for the incentive compatible indemnity schedule is a declining 
marginal (per head) indemnity that incorporates consequential losses more heavily over a range 
of lower prevalence levels.  This form improves upon the status quo by creating incentives for 
disclosure even at very low levels of prevalence and still maintains incentive compatibility over 
higher prevalence levels because aggregate indemnities still cover consequential losses in excess 
of direct animal losses.  Disclosure over all positive prevalence levels prevents widespread losses 
from disease by limiting opportunities for transmission and thereby minimizing social losses 
from disease outbreak. 
  A second approach to implementing constrained efficient disease risk management policy 
would be to make indemnities contingent on self-reporting.  In this scenario, no indemnities are   15
paid out unless disease is discovered as a result of self-disclosure.  If disease is traced back to a 
farm as a result of a livestock sale, testing at slaughter, or via a contact herd, no indemnities 
would be paid if disease was detectable or preventable through best practices.  The reporting 
incentives produced by such a program are very strong.  As long as indemnities are only paid for 
animals that are actually confirmed to be sick after testing, incentives for good management 
should not be distorted.  Paying farmers for false positives will not facilitate the desired behavior 
and has the potential to inflate the cost of the program.  A proposal of this kind may or may not 
be considered politically feasible, but the implementation cost of incentive compatible policy 
may be minimized with such a compensation rule by reducing additional monitoring resources 
necessary to ensure that condition (4) holds when penalties are optimally selected.  In Belgium 
and the Netherlands, similar efforts to induce early reporting no longer compensate producers for 
dead animals and only partially compensate them for diseased stock (Horst, deVos, Tomassen, 
and Stelwagen). 
  The discussion of incentive compatibility applies not only to public policy but also to the 
development of private insurance for livestock disease protection.  If private coverage is 
available to farmers, the incentives provided by livestock insurance contracts could potentially 
be in competition with the objectives of policy while satisfying the individual objectives of 
producers (i.e., income smoothing as risk management).  Careful consideration in the design of 
private market coverage for livestock disease losses is required in order to ensure that public 
policy and private risk management products are jointly incentive compatible.  Also, design of 
public policy should take into account the role that private coverage could play in achieving 
public policy objectives and how government decisions may hinder or bolster private markets for   16




Information is inherently asymmetric between farmers and government agencies responsible for 
livestock disease prevention and eradication.  Incentive compatibility is crucial to overcoming 
the ex ante (private biosecurity) and ex post (disclosure of disease status) hidden action problems 
present in the implementation of risk management policy.  We find that two separate 
mechanisms are needed to solve both moral hazard problems jointly, while current policy relies 
on a single indemnity based on a fair market value calculation.  Our theoretical model predicts 
that when optimally chosen penalties can be used to ensure truthful disclosure, total indemnities 
must exceed direct losses and marginal indemnities should increase at a slower rate than 
marginal costs to achieve the social planner’s desired level of private biosecurity.  Full insurance 
is not optimal when these incentive compatibility conditions are satisfied as risk averse farmers 
must bear some of the risk. 
  Several topics not considered in this analysis are topics for future research.  Greater 
consideration of the cost requirements of ongoing monitoring needed to achieve incentive 
compatibility in ex post reporting is an important issue for government agencies or private 
insurers.  The nature of reciprocating externalities in livestock disease epidemics is of particular 
interest given the complex effect that this may have on private decision making.  Such 
externalities result not only from disease transmission, but also from market impacts that result 
from localized infection (quarantine areas within a country where disease is contained) or   17
widespread epidemic which can lead to trade restrictions that affect an entire livestock sector 
regardless of individual farm disease status. 
 
Appendix 
The first order condition associated with the farmer’s problem is given by the constraint to 
problem (6), or  
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This is an optimal response to the indemnity payment, I(θ); however, the indemnity payment is 
only second-best because the regulator is constrained by the farmer’s response.  If the regulator 
were not constrained, then for a first-best outcome it would have the farmer choose additional 















where c is a constant.  c=0 for the farmer’s problem, while c=c*<0 for the first-best outcome.  
Using this notation, the Lagrangian can be re-written as   
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 since an increase in c when c=0 implies a decrease in welfare as the 
solution moves farther away from the first-best outcome c*<0.  Hence, µ>0. 
   18
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